coinos-server.git/lib/ecash.ts, branch master

ecash: identify our own tokens by keyset, not by the mint url

2026-09-22T02:23:57Z

The mint url in a cashu token is a label the sending wallet writes in, and tokens of ours turn up carrying stray ports and paths. Fetching it to compare pubkeys therefore rejected perfectly good tokens, and meant every /cash entry point made an outbound request to a user-supplied address. Keyset ids are derived from the mint's public keys, so a token whose proofs are all on our keysets is ours whatever url it names; a foreign one still fails, and now with a clear message instead of cashu-ts's short-id mapping error. A miss refreshes the cached keyset list once, in case of a rotation. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context)

ecash: redeem tokens by melting to the user's own invoice

2026-09-16T11:53:22Z

Redeeming ecash is now a plain NUT-05 melt into a Lightning invoice owned by the redeeming user, credited by the regular lightning listener. Drop the house proof pool and its lock, the /mint and /melt routes, and the special-casing of a mint account in NWC and payment routing. Tokens are decoded against the mint's keyset list so short v1 ids resolve, and an empty keyset list is never cached. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1

ecash: make claims work against the v1 keyset mint

2026-09-14T15:50:31Z

cashu-ts 2.9.0 only derives v0 keyset ids, so CashuWallet rejected the mint's current keyset and receive() could never run. Build the wallet from keys preloaded off our own mint instead of verifying, decode tokens with the keysets (2.9.0 shortens v1 ids in the tokens it encodes, and won't expand them otherwise), and treat an unreadable house-pool value as empty rather than throwing — the pool key had been found holding a bare integer, which surfaced as "n.startsWith is not a function" on every redeem. The pool write is awaited so a dropped set can't strand freshly swapped proofs. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0166Ci2XdCair1B9ych7w8dq

security: drop the admin endpoint surface and land pending hardening

2026-09-14T03:44:48Z

Removes the admin-gated endpoints and the account flags they set, plus a batch of hardening that had accumulated uncommitted in the tree. These were deployed and verified together, so they land as one change. admin surface: - drop POST /hidepay, POST /unlimit and GET /users, their handlers, and the now-unused admin preValidation export - `unlimited` was only ever written, never read; `hidepay` only appeared in output projections. Both flags go, along with their whitelist, public-fields and type entries. request log: - redactBody now recurses. It only masked top-level keys, so a body that nests credentials one level down wrote them to the log in plaintext, and pin fields were not on the list at all. payments: - sendOnchain/build gate `aid` through requireAccount, so a caller can only spend from an account it owns - sendOnchain signs only a tx we composed, matched against a short-lived per-account build receipt - raise xpay retry_for to 60s; route-finding preferred a drained zero-fee hop and burned the whole budget on it. check()'s reversal window keeps its 2x margin. ecash / invoices / webhooks: - resolve a token's mint through the IP-pinning fetcher instead of plain fetch, closing an unauthenticated SSRF path into the internal network - reject non-positive amounts before the balance write - /sign requires the caller to own the address, rather than signing under any address the hot wallet controls - webhook delivery no longer disables TLS verification; the body carries the merchant's shared secret registration: - refuse a username the v3 registrar holds unless the caller's own nostr key is the holder (lib/names.ts) liquid: - honour the deposit kill switch at invoice generation and at credit elements image: - pin 23.3.4 and verify the release tarball checksum Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0112TGi9GGNWqji1XQ5jZRzc

ecash: serialize the shared cash-key read-modify-write (S13)

2026-08-08T06:29:27Z

The house Cashu holdings live as one token under redis `cash`. claim() and mint() decoded the current proofs, swapped at the mint, then wrote back — with no lock. Two concurrent claims read the same proofs and the later write clobbered the earlier, so already-swapped proofs vanished from the token while both users stayed credited (an insolvency leak, triggerable via the unauthenticated /ecash/:id callback). Wrap both read-swap-write sequences in an in-process mutex. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8

remove logs

2026-03-17T06:53:13Z

remove total user balances

2025-03-28T18:02:47Z

picture not profile

2025-01-01T00:52:14Z

api

2024-11-23T06:59:29Z

rm tags

2024-11-23T06:49:36Z