| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age | Files | Lines |
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build() is called from both /payments (the actual send path) and /fee
(the fee-estimation endpoint). Locking UTXOs in build() meant that every
fee quote was reserving inputs that never got broadcast, slowly leaking
UTXO locks until a bitcoind restart cleared them — eventually starving
the wallet of selectable inputs even when balance was healthy.
The lock belongs at the point where we're actually about to broadcast,
which is sendOnchain. Released in the catch path on broadcast failure;
on success, the inputs become spent and the lock is moot.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <[email protected]>
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Follows up the Apr 29 double-credit incident. Two parallel callers of
/confirm (walletnotify, catchUp, bulk sweeps) could each read
p.confirmed=false and each run the multi() that increments balance —
because main-db pointers were sometimes missing while arc still had them,
gf()'s arc fallback returned stale state. Three pieces here:
- routes/payments.ts: SET NX EX 60 lock around the /confirm credit block
keyed by `confirmlock:${txid}:${vout}`. Concurrent callers short-circuit
cleanly. The lock is released on success and on every early-return.
- lib/payments.ts credit() + routes/payments.ts /confirm: mirror the
payment/invoice records and the `payment:<txid>:<vout>` / `payment:<hash>`
pointer keys into arc as soon as they're written. gf() will then find
the prior credit via arc fallback even if the main-db copy is wiped by
a future data-loss event.
- routes/payments.ts hide `revertedDuplicate` payments from the user's
payment list — matches the same filter added to lib/nwc.ts list_transactions
so reverted records never surface in either rendering path.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <[email protected]>
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Three small NWC robustness fixes that surfaced from the Apr 29
double-credit cleanup:
- fail loudly when an NWC request references a pubkey whose user record
no longer exists (migrated/deleted account); previously crashed inside
handle() on `user.id`
- swallow `pubkey not found` and `user not found` in the per-event catch
so deleted-app/migrated-user spam doesn't fill the error log — these
are client-side staleness, not server faults
- use gf() instead of g() when fetching payment records (consistent with
the rest of the codebase: arc fallback for wiped main-db pointers)
- filter `revertedDuplicate` payments out of list_transactions so
clients never see the doubled records that were later reverted
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <[email protected]>
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The previous check at debit() read ${type}:limit, compared amount, and
deferred any decrement to the next freezeCheck tick (every 10s). That made
the check non-atomic: a burst of concurrent withdrawals could each pass
the same stale limit value before any reconciliation happened. Combined
with the /gateway abuse, this allowed the hot wallet to be drained.
withLimitLock() serializes the check + db.decrBy inside a per-type async
mutex, and freezeCheck also takes the lock when overwriting limits so its
10s reconciliation can't race in-flight checks. Single-process only;
distributed lock or TigerBeetle reservation needed if app ever scales out.
Trade-off: decremented limits are not refunded on payment failure — they
get reset by the next freezeCheck within 10s. Acceptable false-deny
window in exchange for correctness against bursts.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <[email protected]>
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Unauthenticated arbitrary db.set abuse vector. Exploited to inflate user
balances and override safety controls (bitcoin:limit, limit, hardfreeze,
freeze) in real time, leading to a hot-wallet drain. Route and handler
both fully removed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <[email protected]>
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Skip non-lightning entries in pending payments check and handle
malformed password hashes gracefully during login.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]>
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Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]>
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Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <[email protected]>
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