From d8a361bdcfaa8cc5b39d9675e74b0e1d2e42be2c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Adam Soltys Date: Sun, 13 Sep 2026 20:44:48 -0700 Subject: security: drop the admin endpoint surface and land pending hardening Removes the admin-gated endpoints and the account flags they set, plus a batch of hardening that had accumulated uncommitted in the tree. These were deployed and verified together, so they land as one change. admin surface: - drop POST /hidepay, POST /unlimit and GET /users, their handlers, and the now-unused admin preValidation export - `unlimited` was only ever written, never read; `hidepay` only appeared in output projections. Both flags go, along with their whitelist, public-fields and type entries. request log: - redactBody now recurses. It only masked top-level keys, so a body that nests credentials one level down wrote them to the log in plaintext, and pin fields were not on the list at all. payments: - sendOnchain/build gate `aid` through requireAccount, so a caller can only spend from an account it owns - sendOnchain signs only a tx we composed, matched against a short-lived per-account build receipt - raise xpay retry_for to 60s; route-finding preferred a drained zero-fee hop and burned the whole budget on it. check()'s reversal window keeps its 2x margin. ecash / invoices / webhooks: - resolve a token's mint through the IP-pinning fetcher instead of plain fetch, closing an unauthenticated SSRF path into the internal network - reject non-positive amounts before the balance write - /sign requires the caller to own the address, rather than signing under any address the hot wallet controls - webhook delivery no longer disables TLS verification; the body carries the merchant's shared secret registration: - refuse a username the v3 registrar holds unless the caller's own nostr key is the holder (lib/names.ts) liquid: - honour the deposit kill switch at invoice generation and at credit elements image: - pin 23.3.4 and verify the release tarball checksum Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0112TGi9GGNWqji1XQ5jZRzc --- routes/ecash.ts | 11 ++++++++++- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) (limited to 'routes/ecash.ts') diff --git a/routes/ecash.ts b/routes/ecash.ts index e1e70490..4a1806a3 100644 --- a/routes/ecash.ts +++ b/routes/ecash.ts @@ -98,10 +98,19 @@ export default { user, } = req; try { - amount = Math.round(amount / 1000); const ref = preimage; const { lightning: type } = PaymentType; if (user.username !== "mint") fail("unauthorized"); + + amount = Math.round(amount / 1000); + // A negative (or NaN) amount here is a direct ledger-inflation primitive: + // db.debit subtracts it, so -N ADDS N to the balance, and the stored + // record gets amount: -(-N). The caller gate above limits this to the + // mint service account, but that account is not a trust boundary we want + // the ledger's integrity resting on — mirror the check debit() makes in + // lib/payments.ts before any balance write. + if (!Number.isFinite(amount) || amount <= 0) + fail("Amount must be greater than zero"); const { id: uid, currency } = user; const ourfee = await db.debit( `balance:${uid}`, -- cgit v1.2.3