import config from "$config";
import { db } from "$lib/db";
import { fail, getUser } from "$lib/utils";
import { quiet, suppressed } from "$lib/logging";
import fastifyPassport from "@fastify/passport";
import jwt from "passport-jwt";

export const optional = {
  preValidation: fastifyPassport.authenticate(
    "jwt",
    { session: false },
    (req, res, err, user, info) => {
      req.user = user;
    },
  ),
};

export const auth = {
  preValidation: fastifyPassport.authenticate("jwt", {
    authInfo: false,
    session: false,
  }),
};

export const requirePin = async ({ body, user }) => {
  if (!user || (user.pin && user.pin !== body.pin)) fail("Invalid pin");
};

// A caller-supplied `aid` decides which account's node wallet composes and
// signs a withdrawal and whose balance gets debited, so it has to be an
// account the caller actually owns. `${uid}:accounts` is the ownership list —
// the same one GET /account/:id and payments.list already check — and a user's
// own id is in it. Omitted `aid` means "my own account".
export const requireAccount = async ({ aid, user }) => {
  if (!user) fail("unauthorized");
  if (!aid || aid === user.id) return user.id;
  if ((await db.lPos(`${user.id}:accounts`, aid)) === null)
    fail("unauthorized");
  return aid;
};

export const jwtStrategy = new jwt.Strategy(
  {
    jwtFromRequest: jwt.ExtractJwt.fromExtractors([
      jwt.ExtractJwt.fromAuthHeaderAsBearerToken(),
      (req) => (req.cookies ? req.cookies.token : null),
    ]),
    secretOrKey: config.jwt,
    passReqToCallback: true,
  },
  async (req, payload, next) => {
    const { originalUrl: u, method: m } = req;

    let { id } = payload;
    const wl = { GET: ["/invoice", "/payments"], POST: ["/invoice"] };

    if (id.endsWith("-ro") && wl[m].some((p) => u.startsWith(p)))
      id = id.slice(0, -3);

    const user = await getUser(id);

    // Hard eviction: an account in the `evicted` set cannot authenticate AT ALL
    // — every request, every endpoint — regardless of source IP/VPN. Unlike the
    // `blacklist` freeze (which only blocks sends), this kills the value of a
    // compromised/attacker JWT outright. Match on the immutable uid OR username
    // so a rename can't shake it.
    if (
      user &&
      ((await db.sIsMember("evicted", user.id)) ||
        (await db.sIsMember("evicted", user.username?.toLowerCase?.().trim())))
    ) {
      // Distinctive, greppable line carrying the real source IP so the realtime
      // auto-banner (scripts/atk-autoban.sh) can insta-ban it at Cloudflare.
      // Throttled per account. An evicted JWT replayed from a rotating proxy
      // pool otherwise emits one line per request and
      // has atk-autoban.sh place a Cloudflare block on every residential IP it
      // sees, which protects nothing. First hit logs with its IP; afterwards
      // one summary per 10 minutes, worded so the auto-banner ignores it.
      const n = quiet(`evicted:${user.id}`);
      if (n !== null)
        console.error(
          n
            ? `evicted-auth ${user.username} ${suppressed(n)}`
            : `EVICTED_AUTH ${user.username} ${req.headers["cf-connecting-ip"] || req.ip}`,
        );
      return next(null, false);
    }

    next(null, user);
  },
);