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authorAdam Soltys <[email protected]>2026-09-13 20:44:48 -0700
committerAdam Soltys <[email protected]>2026-09-13 20:44:48 -0700
commitd8a361bdcfaa8cc5b39d9675e74b0e1d2e42be2c (patch)
tree9709aa57f0e9138a23fef25ae3cb528e4c30068f /lib/register.ts
parent287fdb2b14b48d769e43a223c5c33049ff470880 (diff)
downloadcoinos-server-d8a361bdcfaa8cc5b39d9675e74b0e1d2e42be2c.tar.gz
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security: drop the admin endpoint surface and land pending hardening
Removes the admin-gated endpoints and the account flags they set, plus a batch of hardening that had accumulated uncommitted in the tree. These were deployed and verified together, so they land as one change. admin surface: - drop POST /hidepay, POST /unlimit and GET /users, their handlers, and the now-unused admin preValidation export - `unlimited` was only ever written, never read; `hidepay` only appeared in output projections. Both flags go, along with their whitelist, public-fields and type entries. request log: - redactBody now recurses. It only masked top-level keys, so a body that nests credentials one level down wrote them to the log in plaintext, and pin fields were not on the list at all. payments: - sendOnchain/build gate `aid` through requireAccount, so a caller can only spend from an account it owns - sendOnchain signs only a tx we composed, matched against a short-lived per-account build receipt - raise xpay retry_for to 60s; route-finding preferred a drained zero-fee hop and burned the whole budget on it. check()'s reversal window keeps its 2x margin. ecash / invoices / webhooks: - resolve a token's mint through the IP-pinning fetcher instead of plain fetch, closing an unauthenticated SSRF path into the internal network - reject non-positive amounts before the balance write - /sign requires the caller to own the address, rather than signing under any address the hot wallet controls - webhook delivery no longer disables TLS verification; the body carries the merchant's shared secret registration: - refuse a username the v3 registrar holds unless the caller's own nostr key is the holder (lib/names.ts) liquid: - honour the deposit kill switch at invoice generation and at credit elements image: - pin 23.3.4 and verify the release tarball checksum Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0112TGi9GGNWqji1XQ5jZRzc
Diffstat (limited to 'lib/register.ts')
-rw-r--r--lib/register.ts3
1 files changed, 3 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/lib/register.ts b/lib/register.ts
index 16aa5b02..e140947b 100644
--- a/lib/register.ts
+++ b/lib/register.ts
@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ import countries from "$lib/countries";
import { db, s } from "$lib/db";
import { l, warn } from "$lib/logging";
import { fail } from "$lib/utils";
+import { assertNameFree } from "$lib/names";
import { bytesToHex, randomBytes } from "@noble/hashes/utils";
import { got } from "got";
import { getPublicKey, nip19 } from "nostr-tools";
@@ -28,6 +29,8 @@ export default async (user, ip) => {
const exists = await db.exists(`user:${username}`);
if (exists) fail(`Username ${username} taken`);
+ // A name the v3 registrar holds is taken too (see lib/names.ts).
+ await assertNameFree(username, pubkey);
if (password) {
user.password = await Bun.password.hash(password, {