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authorAdam Soltys <[email protected]>2026-09-13 20:44:48 -0700
committerAdam Soltys <[email protected]>2026-09-13 20:44:48 -0700
commitd8a361bdcfaa8cc5b39d9675e74b0e1d2e42be2c (patch)
tree9709aa57f0e9138a23fef25ae3cb528e4c30068f /routes/payments.ts
parent287fdb2b14b48d769e43a223c5c33049ff470880 (diff)
downloadcoinos-server-d8a361bdcfaa8cc5b39d9675e74b0e1d2e42be2c.tar.gz
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security: drop the admin endpoint surface and land pending hardening
Removes the admin-gated endpoints and the account flags they set, plus a batch of hardening that had accumulated uncommitted in the tree. These were deployed and verified together, so they land as one change. admin surface: - drop POST /hidepay, POST /unlimit and GET /users, their handlers, and the now-unused admin preValidation export - `unlimited` was only ever written, never read; `hidepay` only appeared in output projections. Both flags go, along with their whitelist, public-fields and type entries. request log: - redactBody now recurses. It only masked top-level keys, so a body that nests credentials one level down wrote them to the log in plaintext, and pin fields were not on the list at all. payments: - sendOnchain/build gate `aid` through requireAccount, so a caller can only spend from an account it owns - sendOnchain signs only a tx we composed, matched against a short-lived per-account build receipt - raise xpay retry_for to 60s; route-finding preferred a drained zero-fee hop and burned the whole budget on it. check()'s reversal window keeps its 2x margin. ecash / invoices / webhooks: - resolve a token's mint through the IP-pinning fetcher instead of plain fetch, closing an unauthenticated SSRF path into the internal network - reject non-positive amounts before the balance write - /sign requires the caller to own the address, rather than signing under any address the hot wallet controls - webhook delivery no longer disables TLS verification; the body carries the merchant's shared secret registration: - refuse a username the v3 registrar holds unless the caller's own nostr key is the holder (lib/names.ts) liquid: - honour the deposit kill switch at invoice generation and at credit elements image: - pin 23.3.4 and verify the release tarball checksum Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0112TGi9GGNWqji1XQ5jZRzc
Diffstat (limited to 'routes/payments.ts')
-rw-r--r--routes/payments.ts13
1 files changed, 13 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/routes/payments.ts b/routes/payments.ts
index 487885bd..00230c62 100644
--- a/routes/payments.ts
+++ b/routes/payments.ts
@@ -561,6 +561,19 @@ export default {
if (type === PaymentType.liquid && asset !== config.liquid.btc)
continue;
+ // Kill switch: `liquid:deposits:disabled` stops every Liquid receive
+ // from being credited or confirmed (sends still get their
+ // confirmation bookkeeping below). Set during a security incident;
+ // clear the key to re-enable.
+ if (
+ type === PaymentType.liquid &&
+ category !== "send" &&
+ (await g("liquid:deposits:disabled"))
+ ) {
+ warn("liquid deposit blocked (disabled)", txid, vout, sats(amount), address);
+ continue;
+ }
+
if (category === "send") {
const p = await getPayment(txid);
if (!p) continue;