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| author | Adam Soltys <[email protected]> | 2026-09-29 08:37:39 -0700 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Adam Soltys <[email protected]> | 2026-09-29 08:37:47 -0700 |
| commit | e96ad1cea4192a608a7f15896e4b690b57bf8fc9 (patch) | |
| tree | fa6af41a1583e3830c03c907fcd02b54b024aab6 /routes | |
| parent | b1e175c1faa46ed67cf0575f8d8808f1ae10892c (diff) | |
| download | coinos-server-e96ad1cea4192a608a7f15896e4b690b57bf8fc9.tar.gz coinos-server-e96ad1cea4192a608a7f15896e4b690b57bf8fc9.zip | |
invoices: don't let a supplied id overwrite another user's invoice
generate() writes invoice:<id> wholesale with the caller's uid, and the old
bolt11 pointer keeps resolving to that id, so passing someone else's invoice
id re-pointed their invoice at the caller's account. Invoice ids aren't
secret (LUD-21 verify URLs, invoice pages, receipts), so refuse an existing
id that belongs to a different user, both in generate() and in POST /invoice
for anonymous pay-page callers. Both fail with "invoice not found" so ids
can't be probed for existence.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <[email protected]>
Diffstat (limited to 'routes')
| -rw-r--r-- | routes/invoices.ts | 10 |
1 files changed, 10 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/routes/invoices.ts b/routes/invoices.ts index 9ba45af6..b8d06bba 100644 --- a/routes/invoices.ts +++ b/routes/invoices.ts @@ -36,6 +36,16 @@ export default { else invoice.own = false; try { + // A supplied id that already exists is an UPDATE of that record — + // generate() rewrites it wholesale. Only the authenticated owner may do + // that. Without this, an anonymous pay-page session passing + // body.user = merchant could rewrite the amount/memo of a merchant's + // live invoice. generate() separately refuses to move an invoice to a + // different uid. + if (invoice?.id) { + const existing = await getInvoice(invoice.id); + if (existing && existing.uid !== req.user.id) fail("invoice not found"); + } const result = await generate({ invoice, user }); res.send(result); } catch (e) { |
