1 files changed, 56 insertions, 16 deletions

diff --git a/lib/auth.ts b/lib/auth.ts
index 29edcf61..107c44f4 100644
--- a/lib/auth.ts
+++ b/lib/auth.ts
@@ -1,20 +1,10 @@
-import fastifyPassport from "@fastify/passport";
-import { g } from "$lib/db";
-import { fail, getUser } from "$lib/utils";
 import config from "$config";
+import { db } from "$lib/db";
+import { fail, getUser } from "$lib/utils";
+import { quiet, suppressed } from "$lib/logging";
+import fastifyPassport from "@fastify/passport";
 import jwt from "passport-jwt";
 
-export const admin = {
-  preValidation: fastifyPassport.authenticate(
-    "jwt",
-    { session: false },
-    (req, res, err, user, info) => {
-      if (!user.admin) return res.code(401).send("unauthorized");
-      req.user = user;
-    },
-  ),
-};
-
 export const optional = {
   preValidation: fastifyPassport.authenticate(
     "jwt",
@@ -36,6 +26,19 @@ export const requirePin = async ({ body, user }) => {
   if (!user || (user.pin && user.pin !== body.pin)) fail("Invalid pin");
 };
 
+// A caller-supplied `aid` decides which account's node wallet composes and
+// signs a withdrawal and whose balance gets debited, so it has to be an
+// account the caller actually owns. `${uid}:accounts` is the ownership list —
+// the same one GET /account/:id and payments.list already check — and a user's
+// own id is in it. Omitted `aid` means "my own account".
+export const requireAccount = async ({ aid, user }) => {
+  if (!user) fail("unauthorized");
+  if (!aid || aid === user.id) return user.id;
+  if ((await db.lPos(`${user.id}:accounts`, aid)) === null)
+    fail("unauthorized");
+  return aid;
+};
+
 export const jwtStrategy = new jwt.Strategy(
   {
     jwtFromRequest: jwt.ExtractJwt.fromExtractors([
@@ -43,9 +46,46 @@ export const jwtStrategy = new jwt.Strategy(
       (req) => (req.cookies ? req.cookies.token : null),
     ]),
     secretOrKey: config.jwt,
+    passReqToCallback: true,
   },
-  async (payload, next) => {
-    const user = await getUser(payload.id);
+  async (req, payload, next) => {
+    const { originalUrl: u, method: m } = req;
+
+    let { id } = payload;
+    const wl = { GET: ["/invoice", "/payments"], POST: ["/invoice"] };
+
+    if (id.endsWith("-ro") && wl[m].some((p) => u.startsWith(p)))
+      id = id.slice(0, -3);
+
+    const user = await getUser(id);
+
+    // Hard eviction: an account in the `evicted` set cannot authenticate AT ALL
+    // — every request, every endpoint — regardless of source IP/VPN. Unlike the
+    // `blacklist` freeze (which only blocks sends), this kills the value of a
+    // compromised/attacker JWT outright. Match on the immutable uid OR username
+    // so a rename can't shake it.
+    if (
+      user &&
+      ((await db.sIsMember("evicted", user.id)) ||
+        (await db.sIsMember("evicted", user.username?.toLowerCase?.().trim())))
+    ) {
+      // Distinctive, greppable line carrying the real source IP so the realtime
+      // auto-banner (scripts/atk-autoban.sh) can insta-ban it at Cloudflare.
+      // Throttled per account. An evicted JWT replayed from a rotating proxy
+      // pool otherwise emits one line per request and
+      // has atk-autoban.sh place a Cloudflare block on every residential IP it
+      // sees, which protects nothing. First hit logs with its IP; afterwards
+      // one summary per 10 minutes, worded so the auto-banner ignores it.
+      const n = quiet(`evicted:${user.id}`);
+      if (n !== null)
+        console.error(
+          n
+            ? `evicted-auth ${user.username} ${suppressed(n)}`
+            : `EVICTED_AUTH ${user.username} ${req.headers["cf-connecting-ip"] || req.ip}`,
+        );
+      return next(null, false);
+    }
+
     next(null, user);
   },
 );