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-rw-r--r--routes/invoices.ts17
-rw-r--r--routes/payments.ts2
2 files changed, 15 insertions, 4 deletions
diff --git a/routes/invoices.ts b/routes/invoices.ts
index 0cb73687..61cf203b 100644
--- a/routes/invoices.ts
+++ b/routes/invoices.ts
@@ -49,12 +49,23 @@ export default {
const { body } = req;
const { tip, webhook, secret } = body.invoice;
- if (tip < 0) fail("Invalid tip");
-
let invoice = await gf(`invoice:${id}`);
+ if (!invoice) fail("invoice not found");
const user = await g(`user:${invoice.uid}`);
- if (typeof tip !== "undefined") invoice.tip = tip;
+ if (typeof tip !== "undefined") {
+ const t = Number.parseInt(tip);
+ if (!Number.isSafeInteger(t) || t < 0 || t > 2_100_000_000_000_000)
+ fail("Invalid tip");
+ // Defense-in-depth: never change the tip once the invoice is paid/
+ // settled. The primary mint guard is on the credit side (it uses the
+ // tip the sender was actually debited); this stops post-settlement
+ // tampering. The endpoint stays open by design — payers set tips on
+ // merchants' invoices before paying — so we do NOT require ownership.
+ if (invoice.received > 0 || invoice.settled)
+ fail("Invoice already settled");
+ invoice.tip = t;
+ }
if (webhook && secret) {
if (invoice.uid !== req.user?.id) fail("Unauthorized");
diff --git a/routes/payments.ts b/routes/payments.ts
index 7dc45058..9c62d2bb 100644
--- a/routes/payments.ts
+++ b/routes/payments.ts
@@ -641,7 +641,7 @@ export default {
let p;
if (payee === id) {
p = await debit({ hash: pr, amount, memo, user });
- await credit({ hash: pr, amount, memo, ref: user.id });
+ await credit({ hash: pr, amount, memo, ref: user.id, tip: p.tip });
} else p = await sendLightning({ user, pr, amount, fee, memo });
res.send(p);