| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age | Files | Lines | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| * | logging: throttle log lines that clients can trigger at will | Adam Soltys | 2026-09-29 | 1 | -3/+13 |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | Evicted-JWT replays, blocked sends from frozen or limited accounts and failed payment retries each logged one line per request, so a looping client could flood the log, and an evicted token replayed across a proxy pool made atk-autoban.sh block every IP it saw. Add quiet()/suppressed() in lib/logging.ts: the first occurrence per key logs as before, repeats within the window are counted and reported on the next line that gets through. The evicted-auth summary line is worded so the auto-banner ignores it. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <[email protected]> | ||||
| * | security: drop the admin endpoint surface and land pending hardening | Adam Soltys | 2026-09-13 | 1 | -11/+13 |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Removes the admin-gated endpoints and the account flags they set, plus a batch of hardening that had accumulated uncommitted in the tree. These were deployed and verified together, so they land as one change. admin surface: - drop POST /hidepay, POST /unlimit and GET /users, their handlers, and the now-unused admin preValidation export - `unlimited` was only ever written, never read; `hidepay` only appeared in output projections. Both flags go, along with their whitelist, public-fields and type entries. request log: - redactBody now recurses. It only masked top-level keys, so a body that nests credentials one level down wrote them to the log in plaintext, and pin fields were not on the list at all. payments: - sendOnchain/build gate `aid` through requireAccount, so a caller can only spend from an account it owns - sendOnchain signs only a tx we composed, matched against a short-lived per-account build receipt - raise xpay retry_for to 60s; route-finding preferred a drained zero-fee hop and burned the whole budget on it. check()'s reversal window keeps its 2x margin. ecash / invoices / webhooks: - resolve a token's mint through the IP-pinning fetcher instead of plain fetch, closing an unauthenticated SSRF path into the internal network - reject non-positive amounts before the balance write - /sign requires the caller to own the address, rather than signing under any address the hot wallet controls - webhook delivery no longer disables TLS verification; the body carries the merchant's shared secret registration: - refuse a username the v3 registrar holds unless the caller's own nostr key is the holder (lib/names.ts) liquid: - honour the deposit kill switch at invoice generation and at credit elements image: - pin 23.3.4 and verify the release tarball checksum Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0112TGi9GGNWqji1XQ5jZRzc | ||||
| * | auth: log evicted-account auth attempts with source IP | Adam Soltys | 2026-06-28 | 1 | -1/+7 |
| | | | | | | | | | Emit a greppable EVICTED_AUTH line (username + cf-connecting-ip) when an evicted account's JWT is used, so the real-time auto-banner can block the source IP at the edge immediately rather than waiting for the hourly scan. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]> | ||||
| * | auth: hard-evict banned accounts at the JWT layer | Adam Soltys | 2026-06-27 | 1 | -0/+14 |
| | | | | | | | | | | | Add an `evicted` set check in the JWT strategy: an evicted account fails authentication on every request and every endpoint, regardless of source IP. The existing blacklist only blocks sends, so a compromised/abusive JWT could still authenticate and read/probe; eviction kills it outright. Matches on uid or username so a rename can't evade it. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]> | ||||
| * | support readonly tokens | Adam Soltys | 2025-09-04 | 1 | -3/+11 |
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| * | record lnurl invoice | Adam Soltys | 2025-07-16 | 1 | -2/+2 |
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| * | biome lint | Adam Soltys | 2024-10-31 | 1 | -3/+3 |
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| * | typescript | Adam Soltys | 2024-08-26 | 1 | -0/+51 |
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