| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age | Files | Lines |
|---|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
The expiry was only stored on our invoice record, so CLN kept issuing
invoices for the offer after it had expired. Pass it as absolute_expiry,
and accept single_use to cap an offer at one payment.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]>
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
generate() took any existing account id as the credit target, so an
invoice could carry one user's name while paying into someone else's
account. A supplied aid now has to be in the invoice user's own account
list; otherwise the invoice credits that user's main account.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01KCxLg8s1g8yBwjRwPN4uJR
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
generate() writes invoice:<id> wholesale with the caller's uid, and the old
bolt11 pointer keeps resolving to that id, so passing someone else's invoice
id re-pointed their invoice at the caller's account. Invoice ids aren't
secret (LUD-21 verify URLs, invoice pages, receipts), so refuse an existing
id that belongs to a different user, both in generate() and in POST /invoice
for anonymous pay-page callers. Both fail with "invoice not found" so ids
can't be probed for existence.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <[email protected]>
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
Removes the admin-gated endpoints and the account flags they set, plus a
batch of hardening that had accumulated uncommitted in the tree. These were
deployed and verified together, so they land as one change.
admin surface:
- drop POST /hidepay, POST /unlimit and GET /users, their handlers, and
the now-unused admin preValidation export
- `unlimited` was only ever written, never read; `hidepay` only appeared
in output projections. Both flags go, along with their whitelist,
public-fields and type entries.
request log:
- redactBody now recurses. It only masked top-level keys, so a body that
nests credentials one level down wrote them to the log in plaintext,
and pin fields were not on the list at all.
payments:
- sendOnchain/build gate `aid` through requireAccount, so a caller can
only spend from an account it owns
- sendOnchain signs only a tx we composed, matched against a short-lived
per-account build receipt
- raise xpay retry_for to 60s; route-finding preferred a drained zero-fee
hop and burned the whole budget on it. check()'s reversal window keeps
its 2x margin.
ecash / invoices / webhooks:
- resolve a token's mint through the IP-pinning fetcher instead of plain
fetch, closing an unauthenticated SSRF path into the internal network
- reject non-positive amounts before the balance write
- /sign requires the caller to own the address, rather than signing under
any address the hot wallet controls
- webhook delivery no longer disables TLS verification; the body carries
the merchant's shared secret
registration:
- refuse a username the v3 registrar holds unless the caller's own nostr
key is the holder (lib/names.ts)
liquid:
- honour the deposit kill switch at invoice generation and at credit
elements image:
- pin 23.3.4 and verify the release tarball checksum
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0112TGi9GGNWqji1XQ5jZRzc
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
- invoices: reject caller-supplied bolt11/bolt12; the server always mints its
own. Closes the invoice-registration path behind the shared-node credit and
payment-hijack vectors.
- lightning: skip mint-owned invoices (lbl* label) in the paid-invoice listener.
- payments: lightning free-tier fee credit, withheld for flagged high-throughput
(ln:nofree) accounts which pay an elevated rate; the failed-send reversal
restores credit at the same rate. freezeCheck made crash-resilient. Lightning
and bolt12 sends stay pending until the preimage settles.
- payments (route): validate payment-request / invoice input types.
- logging: collapse repeated xpay failure lines into one.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <[email protected]>
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
- sendLightning fetches an invoice from lno1 offers (payer_note passthrough
for NIP-177 zap intents) and pays it through the existing bolt12 path
- NWC: new nwc#2 pay/receive methods (BIP-321 URIs, payer proofs stubbed
until CLN 26.06 createproof), nip44_v2 alongside nip04 with per-request
scheme detection, dual 23196/23197 notifications, 13194 refreshed when
its content or encryption tag goes stale
- standing per-user bolt12 offer via GET /offer; incoming bolt12 payments
record invreq_payer_note as memo
- parse/fetchinvoice routes handle offers; zap display parses kind 9736
receipts (amount tag + embedded intent) and drops a call to a sync()
helper that never existed
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
POST /preimages now accepts fiat + optional currency (defaults to the
merchant's) as an alternative to a sat price. The fiat amount is stored
per entry and converted to sats at the moment a usePreimage invoice is
created, so the price tracks the exchange rate instead of freezing at
upload time. The invoice also takes on the entry's currency and rate so
receipts display the fiat price exactly as the merchant set it. If no
rate is available for the entry's currency, the preimage is pushed back
onto the queue and creation fails rather than issuing an any-amount
invoice.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
Invoice creation is unauthenticated, so buyers could name their own
price for a queued preimage (create the usePreimage invoice with
amount: 1). POST /preimages now takes an optional price (sats) that is
stored per entry and overrides the requested amount when the preimage
is consumed; omitting it keeps the old any-amount behavior. Also gate
the stored-preimage reveal in credit() on the invoice being fully paid,
since internal sends can settle partial amounts. Bare-hex entries
queued before this change still parse (treated as priceless).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
|
| |\
| |
| |
| |
| | |
# Conflicts:
# lib/payments.ts
|
| | |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| | |
Merchants POST /preimages (auth) to pre-load 32-byte hex preimages into a
FIFO queue; creating an invoice with usePreimage: true consumes the next
one so the invoice's payment hash is sha256(preimage). Paying the invoice
reveals the merchant-chosen secret to the buyer — via their own wallet on
external settlements, and via GET /invoice/:id once settled — enabling
backend-less digital download stores (encrypted files on static hosting,
preimage + public string = decryption key).
- GET /preimages lists the queue with payment hashes so the merchant can
map files to future invoices; POST /preimages/delete clears it
- empty queue fails invoice creation rather than issuing a random
preimage the buyer would pay for but couldn't decrypt with
- preimages cln rejects as already used are discarded and the next tried
- consumed preimages persist at preimage:${payment_hash} (TTL = invoice
expiry) and credit() prefers them as the settlement ref, so internal
coinos-to-coinos payments reveal the real preimage instead of the
sender's uid
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
|
| |/
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
On-chain deposits below 300 sats are dropped by the dust filter in the
confirm/credit path, so a specific-amount bitcoin/liquid invoice under
that threshold can never be credited. Reject creating one at generation
time and point the user at lightning. Any-amount (0) addresses are
unaffected.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]>
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
generate() unconditionally lPush'd the invoice id to `${aid}:invoices`,
but it's also called from the update() handler (tip/webhook changes, and
repeated bolt12 offer creation) re-using the existing id — so each update
re-appended the same id and the user's :invoices accumulated duplicate
entries, rendering the same offer/invoice multiple times. Only push when
the id isn't already in the list (LPOS guard).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]>
|
| | |
|
| | |
|
| | |
|
| | |
|
| | |
|
| | |
|
| | |
|
| | |
|
| | |
|
| | |
|
| | |
|
| | |
|
| | |
|
| | |
|
| | |
|
| | |
|
| | |
|
| | |
|
| | |
|
| | |
|
| | |
|
| | |
|
| | |
|
| | |
|
| | |
|
| | |
|
| | |
|
| | |
|
| | |
|
| | |
|
| | |
|
| | |
|
| | |
|
| | |
|
| | |
|
| | |
|
| | |
|
| |
|
