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import config from "$config";
import { db } from "$lib/db";
import { fail, getUser } from "$lib/utils";
import fastifyPassport from "@fastify/passport";
import jwt from "passport-jwt";
export const optional = {
preValidation: fastifyPassport.authenticate(
"jwt",
{ session: false },
(req, res, err, user, info) => {
req.user = user;
},
),
};
export const auth = {
preValidation: fastifyPassport.authenticate("jwt", {
authInfo: false,
session: false,
}),
};
export const requirePin = async ({ body, user }) => {
if (!user || (user.pin && user.pin !== body.pin)) fail("Invalid pin");
};
// A caller-supplied `aid` decides which account's node wallet composes and
// signs a withdrawal and whose balance gets debited, so it has to be an
// account the caller actually owns. `${uid}:accounts` is the ownership list —
// the same one GET /account/:id and payments.list already check — and a user's
// own id is in it. Omitted `aid` means "my own account".
export const requireAccount = async ({ aid, user }) => {
if (!user) fail("unauthorized");
if (!aid || aid === user.id) return user.id;
if ((await db.lPos(`${user.id}:accounts`, aid)) === null)
fail("unauthorized");
return aid;
};
export const jwtStrategy = new jwt.Strategy(
{
jwtFromRequest: jwt.ExtractJwt.fromExtractors([
jwt.ExtractJwt.fromAuthHeaderAsBearerToken(),
(req) => (req.cookies ? req.cookies.token : null),
]),
secretOrKey: config.jwt,
passReqToCallback: true,
},
async (req, payload, next) => {
const { originalUrl: u, method: m } = req;
let { id } = payload;
const wl = { GET: ["/invoice", "/payments"], POST: ["/invoice"] };
if (id.endsWith("-ro") && wl[m].some((p) => u.startsWith(p)))
id = id.slice(0, -3);
const user = await getUser(id);
// Hard eviction: an account in the `evicted` set cannot authenticate AT ALL
// — every request, every endpoint — regardless of source IP/VPN. Unlike the
// `blacklist` freeze (which only blocks sends), this kills the value of a
// compromised/attacker JWT outright. Match on the immutable uid OR username
// so a rename can't shake it.
if (
user &&
((await db.sIsMember("evicted", user.id)) ||
(await db.sIsMember("evicted", user.username?.toLowerCase?.().trim())))
) {
// Distinctive, greppable line carrying the real source IP so the realtime
// auto-banner (scripts/atk-autoban.sh) can insta-ban it at Cloudflare.
console.error(
`EVICTED_AUTH ${user.username} ${req.headers["cf-connecting-ip"] || req.ip}`,
);
return next(null, false);
}
next(null, user);
},
);
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