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| author | Adam Soltys <[email protected]> | 2026-08-01 20:46:12 -0700 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Adam Soltys <[email protected]> | 2026-08-01 20:46:12 -0700 |
| commit | ed1d996f9dbd6cedc18ec293daba0cfcd745ae2b (patch) | |
| tree | 6d552796e899314d402dc92f6f80886405e296b5 /src/bip353.js | |
| parent | 5986cbf5337593eb11fd984d284bd41da7719a87 (diff) | |
| download | coinosv3-ed1d996f9dbd6cedc18ec293daba0cfcd745ae2b.tar.gz coinosv3-ed1d996f9dbd6cedc18ec293daba0cfcd745ae2b.zip | |
Zappable offer codes and per-name Lightning offers
CLINK offers (noffer): every wallet gets a static offer keypair (synced
across devices, first-minted wins) answering kind-21001 invoice
requests — from open tabs and from the service worker while closed,
which mints against the mirrored state (the record now carries chain-4
and chain-5 key windows) and raises an open-to-receive notification.
Zap requests ride along and their kind-9735 receipts publish once the
payment is claimed. The code is shown in the payment-address card for
pasting into a Nostr profile; the notifier watches and relays kind
21001 alongside NWC.
Payment names also gain a Lightning offer: the registrar creates a
BOLT 12 offer per name on the node and appends lno= to the DNS record;
a settle-forwarder pushes each received payment on to the name's ark
destination from a small float wallet (custody window: seconds between
Lightning settle and the ark send).
Name resolution now runs full client-side DNSSEC validation
(src/dnssec.js): binary DoH, root-anchor chain walk, RSA + ECDSA via
WebCrypto — the resolver is untrusted transport, verified against live
signed zones including the canonical BIP-353 test name.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
Diffstat (limited to 'src/bip353.js')
| -rw-r--r-- | src/bip353.js | 61 |
1 files changed, 17 insertions, 44 deletions
diff --git a/src/bip353.js b/src/bip353.js index 2bacb65..efa1721 100644 --- a/src/bip353.js +++ b/src/bip353.js @@ -1,55 +1,28 @@ -// BIP-353 DNS payment instructions — resolving ₿name@domain to a BIP-21 URI. +// BIP-353 DNS payment instructions — resolving name@domain to a BIP-21 URI. // // The record lives at <name>.user._bitcoin-payment.<domain> as a DNSSEC-signed -// TXT containing one `bitcoin:` URI. Browsers can't do raw DNS, so we resolve -// over DNS-over-HTTPS. TRUST LEVEL, stated honestly: full client-side DNSSEC -// validation (what the BIP ultimately wants) is not implemented yet — instead -// we require agreement between TWO independent validating resolvers -// (Cloudflare and Google), each reporting the answer DNSSEC-authenticated -// (AD flag). Collusion or simultaneous compromise of both is the residual -// risk; a native chain validator is the follow-up. +// TXT containing one `bitcoin:` URI. Resolution runs full client-side DNSSEC +// chain validation (src/dnssec.js): the DoH resolver is untrusted transport, +// and every answer we act on is provably signed from the ICANN root down. -const RESOLVERS = [ - 'https://cloudflare-dns.com/dns-query', - 'https://dns.google/resolve', -]; - -// "a" "b" quoted character-strings → concatenated payload -function txtPayload(data) { - const parts = [...String(data).matchAll(/"((?:[^"\\]|\\.)*)"/g)].map((m) => m[1].replace(/\\(.)/g, '$1')); - return parts.length ? parts.join('') : String(data); -} - -async function queryOne(base, label) { - const r = await fetch(`${base}?name=${label}&type=TXT`, { headers: { accept: 'application/dns-json' } }); - if (!r.ok) throw new Error(`resolver ${r.status}`); - const j = await r.json(); - const uris = (j.Answer || []) - .filter((a) => a.type === 16) - .map((a) => txtPayload(a.data)) - .filter((t) => /^bitcoin:/i.test(t)); - // BIP-353: multiple bitcoin: TXT records at one label are invalid - if (uris.length > 1) throw new Error('multiple payment records'); - return { uri: uris[0] || null, ad: !!j.AD }; -} +import { resolveTxtValidated } from './dnssec.js'; // name like "adam", domain like "halwallet.app" → the bitcoin: URI, or null -// when no record exists. Throws when resolution can't be trusted. +// when no record exists. Throws when the answer can't be proven authentic. export async function resolveBip353(name, domain) { const label = `${name}.user._bitcoin-payment.${domain}`; - const results = await Promise.allSettled(RESOLVERS.map((r) => queryOne(r, label))); - const ok = results.filter((r) => r.status === 'fulfilled').map((r) => r.value); - if (ok.length < 2) { - // one resolver down: accept a single authenticated answer, refuse a - // single unauthenticated one - if (ok.length === 1 && ok[0].uri && ok[0].ad) return ok[0].uri; - if (ok.length === 1 && !ok[0].uri) return null; - throw new Error('could not resolve the name'); + let res; + try { + res = await resolveTxtValidated(label); + } catch (e) { + if (/^no TXT record/.test(e.message)) return null; + throw e; } - if (ok[0].uri !== ok[1].uri) throw new Error('resolvers disagree — refusing'); - if (!ok[0].uri) return null; - if (!ok[0].ad || !ok[1].ad) throw new Error('name is not DNSSEC-signed'); - return ok[0].uri; + const uris = res.txts.filter((t) => /^bitcoin:/i.test(t)); + if (!uris.length) return null; + // BIP-353: multiple bitcoin: TXT records at one label are invalid + if (uris.length > 1) throw new Error('multiple payment records — invalid'); + return uris[0]; } // A pasted payment name: optional ₿, user@domain with a real-looking TLD. |
