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| author | Adam Soltys <[email protected]> | 2026-07-31 12:05:59 -0700 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Adam Soltys <[email protected]> | 2026-07-31 12:05:59 -0700 |
| commit | 142fa01322e624ac12dc24ee7af2583bda89e891 (patch) | |
| tree | 1ba901bb01046327e9f1c89c38ccecb9bf454b04 /tools | |
| parent | 49da2555e84da4a461c070c0d7bb7032c6bb52e4 (diff) | |
| download | coinosv3-142fa01322e624ac12dc24ee7af2583bda89e891.tar.gz coinosv3-142fa01322e624ac12dc24ee7af2583bda89e891.zip | |
Client support for third-party HTLC vtxos (trustless swap bridges)
Speaks the proposed VtxoPolicy::Htlc (type byte 0x08): policy encode/decode,
two-leaf taproot (claimer-with-preimage / refunder-after-expiry), preimage
field on the arkoor cosign request, and GetHtlcPreimage.
ArkManager gains the swap primitives: htlcLock (lock funds claimable only
against a payment hash, refundable by us after expiry), htlcClaim (reveal the
preimage), htlcCosignRefund (hand an unclaimable HTLC back — the server
constrains the outputs to the refunder, so this is safe to expose publicly)
and acceptHtlcRefund.
tools/ark/htlc-bridge-test.js drives a full submarine swap between two
independent wallets against a patched captaind, and asserts the ASP rejects
both a wrong-preimage claim and a preimage-less spend to the bridge itself.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
Diffstat (limited to 'tools')
| -rw-r--r-- | tools/ark/htlc-bridge-test.js | 201 |
1 files changed, 201 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/tools/ark/htlc-bridge-test.js b/tools/ark/htlc-bridge-test.js new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a712316 --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/ark/htlc-bridge-test.js @@ -0,0 +1,201 @@ +// Trustless third-party ark<->LN swap, end to end against a patched captaind +// (VtxoPolicy::Htlc — see docs/third-party-htlc.md). +// +// Two independent hal wallets play the roles: +// alice = user paying a Lightning invoice with ark funds +// bridge = third-party swap provider (NOT the ASP) +// +// Happy path (submarine swap, ark -> LN): +// 1. alice locks funds in an HTLC claimable by the bridge against the +// invoice's payment hash, refundable by alice after expiry +// 2. bridge validates the HTLC, pays the bolt11 (here: clc's invoice), +// learns the preimage, claims the HTLC by revealing it +// 3. alice reads the preimage back from the ASP as proof of payment +// +// Security properties the ASP must enforce (each asserted here): +// - a claim with a WRONG preimage is rejected +// - the bridge cannot spend the HTLC to itself without the preimage +// (theft attempt) — only a full refund to alice is allowed +// - the cooperative refund path works and pays alice +// +// Usage: bun tools/ark/htlc-bridge-test.js (regtest stack + cln-ark up) + +import { execSync } from 'node:child_process'; +import { generateMnemonic, mnemonicToSeedSync } from '@scure/bip39'; +import { wordlist } from '@scure/bip39/wordlists/english'; +import { HDKey } from '@scure/bip32'; +import { hex } from '@scure/base'; +import { sha256 } from '@noble/hashes/sha256'; + +import { ArkManager } from '../../src/ark/manager.js'; +import { buildArkoorSend, cosignWithServer } from '../../src/ark/send.js'; +import { decodeVtxo } from '../../src/ark/proto.js'; +import { validateVtxo } from '../../src/ark/validate.js'; +import { getHtlcPreimage, decodeBolt11 } from '../../src/ark/lightning.js'; + +const ARK = process.env.ARK_URL || 'http://127.0.0.1:3535'; +const ESPLORA = process.env.ESPLORA_URL || 'http://127.0.0.1:30002'; +const BARK = `${process.env.HOME}/bark/target/debug/bark`; +const ALICE_CLI = `${BARK} --datadir ${process.env.HOME}/ark-regtest/alice`; +const CLC = 'docker exec clc lightning-cli --regtest'; + +const sleep = (ms) => new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, ms)); +const sh = (cmd) => execSync(cmd, { shell: '/bin/bash' }).toString().trim(); +// lightning-cli prints progress lines before the JSON body on some commands +const clc = (cmd) => { + const out = sh(`${CLC} ${cmd}`); + return JSON.parse(out.slice(out.indexOf('{'))); +}; + +let ok = true; +const check = (name, cond, detail = '') => { + console.log(` ${cond ? '✓' : '✗'} ${name}${detail ? ' — ' + detail : ''}`); + if (!cond) ok = false; +}; + +// two independent wallets +function newWallet() { + const store = { raw: null }; + const account = HDKey.fromMasterSeed(mnemonicToSeedSync(generateMnemonic(wordlist))) + .derive("m/86'/0'/9'"); + return new ArkManager({ + account, + storage: { load: () => (store.raw ? JSON.parse(store.raw) : null), save: (s) => { store.raw = JSON.stringify(s); } }, + arkUrl: ARK, esploraUrl: ESPLORA, + }).init(); +} + +const alice = await newWallet(); +const bridge = await newWallet(); + +console.log('\n[0] fund both wallets from the bark CLI wallet'); +sh(`${ALICE_CLI} -q send ${alice.address()} "30000 sat"`); +sh(`${ALICE_CLI} -q send ${bridge.address()} "30000 sat"`); +for (let i = 0; i < 12 && (!alice.balance().spendableSat || !bridge.balance().spendableSat); i++) { + await alice.sync(); await bridge.sync(); await sleep(1500); +} +check('alice funded', alice.balance().spendableSat === 30000, JSON.stringify(alice.balance())); +check('bridge funded', bridge.balance().spendableSat === 30000, JSON.stringify(bridge.balance())); + +const tip = await alice.chain.tipHeight(); +// bridge's claim key: index 0 of its own vtxo key chain +const bridgeClaimIndex = 0; +const bridgeClaimPub = hex.encode(bridge._key(bridgeClaimIndex).pubkey); + +// --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +console.log('\n[1] SUBMARINE SWAP: alice pays a clc invoice through the bridge'); +const label = `htlcswap-${Date.now()}`; +const inv = clc(`invoice 5000000 ${label} third-party-htlc-swap`); +const paymentHash = decodeBolt11(inv.bolt11).paymentHash; +console.log(' invoice payment hash:', paymentHash.slice(0, 16) + '…'); + +// 1. alice locks: 5000 sat + a 5 sat bridge fee (undercutting the ASP's 20) +const swapAmount = 5005; +const lock = await alice.htlcLock({ + amountSat: swapAmount, + claimPubkey: bridgeClaimPub, + paymentHash, + htlcExpiry: tip + 100, +}); +check('alice locked into an HTLC', lock.htlcVtxos.length === 1, `${lock.htlcVtxos.length} vtxos`); +const htlcBytes = lock.htlcVtxos[0]; +const htlcVtxo = decodeVtxo(hex.decode(htlcBytes)); +check('htlc policy encodes both parties', htlcVtxo.policy.type === 'htlc' + && htlcVtxo.policy.claimPubkey === bridgeClaimPub + && htlcVtxo.policy.refundPubkey === hex.encode(alice._key(lock.refundIndex).pubkey), + JSON.stringify(htlcVtxo.policy).slice(0, 120)); +check('alice debited', alice.balance().spendableSat === 30000 - swapAmount, JSON.stringify(alice.balance())); + +// 2. the bridge independently validates the HTLC before paying anything +await validateVtxo(htlcVtxo, { + serverPubkey: bridge.serverPub, chain: bridge.chain, allowPolicies: ['htlc'], +}); +check('bridge validated the htlc vtxo chain', true); +check('htlc amount + hash as agreed', htlcVtxo.amountSat === swapAmount + && htlcVtxo.policy.paymentHash === paymentHash); + +// 3. ATTACK: wrong preimage must be rejected by the ASP +let wrongRejected = false; +try { + await bridge.htlcClaim({ + htlcVtxoBytes: htlcBytes, claimKeyIndex: bridgeClaimIndex, + preimage: hex.encode(sha256(new TextEncoder().encode('not-the-preimage'))), + }); +} catch (e) { + wrongRejected = /preimage does not match/i.test(e.message); + if (!wrongRejected) console.log(' unexpected error:', e.message); +} +check('ASP rejects a claim with the wrong preimage', wrongRejected); + +// 4. ATTACK: bridge tries to take the funds without the preimage. Built +// straight against the protocol layer — a malicious bridge wouldn't be +// running our client-side guards, so the ASP has to be the one that refuses. +let theftRejected = false; +try { + const keys = bridge._key(bridgeClaimIndex); + const build = buildArkoorSend({ + input: htlcVtxo, + outputs: [{ amountSat: htlcVtxo.amountSat, userPubkey: bridge._key(1).pubkey }], + serverPubkey: bridge.serverPub, vtxoKeys: keys, + }); + await cosignWithServer(ARK, build, { + input: htlcVtxo, vtxoKeys: keys, serverPubkey: bridge.serverPub, // no preimage + }); +} catch (e) { + theftRejected = /refund pubkey|requires every/i.test(e.message); + if (!theftRejected) console.log(' unexpected error:', e.message); +} +check('ASP rejects a preimage-less spend to the bridge itself (theft)', theftRejected); + +// 5. the bridge pays the invoice for real over Lightning, learning the preimage +const payRes = clc(`pay ${inv.bolt11}`); +check('bridge paid the invoice over LN', payRes.status === 'complete', payRes.status); +const preimage = payRes.payment_preimage; +check('preimage matches the payment hash', hex.encode(sha256(hex.decode(preimage))) === paymentHash); + +// 6. bridge claims the HTLC by revealing the preimage to the ASP +const claimed = await bridge.htlcClaim({ + htlcVtxoBytes: htlcBytes, claimKeyIndex: bridgeClaimIndex, preimage, +}); +check('bridge claimed the htlc', claimed.length === 1); +check('bridge credited', bridge.balance().spendableSat === 30000 + swapAmount, + JSON.stringify(bridge.balance())); + +// 7. alice reads the preimage back from the ASP: proof her payment happened +const revealed = await getHtlcPreimage(ARK, hex.decode(paymentHash)); +check('ASP publishes the revealed preimage', revealed === preimage, `${revealed}`); +check('clc invoice is paid', clc(`listinvoices ${label}`).invoices[0].status === 'paid'); + +// --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +console.log('\n[2] REFUND PATH: a swap the bridge cannot complete'); +const preimage2 = sha256(new TextEncoder().encode('never-revealed-' + Date.now())); +const hash2 = hex.encode(sha256(preimage2)); +const beforeRefund = alice.balance().spendableSat; +const lock2 = await alice.htlcLock({ + amountSat: 3000, claimPubkey: bridgeClaimPub, paymentHash: hash2, htlcExpiry: tip + 100, +}); +check('alice locked the second htlc', lock2.htlcVtxos.length === 1); +check('alice debited again', alice.balance().spendableSat === beforeRefund - 3000); + +// the bridge gives up and cooperatively refunds — the ASP constrains the +// outputs to alice's refund key, so this is safe to expose as a public API +const refundVtxos = await bridge.htlcCosignRefund({ + htlcVtxoBytes: lock2.htlcVtxos[0], claimKeyIndex: bridgeClaimIndex, +}); +const refunded = await alice.acceptHtlcRefund({ + vtxoBytesList: refundVtxos, refundIndex: lock2.refundIndex, +}); +check('alice got her sats back', refunded === 3000, `${refunded} sat`); +check('alice whole again', alice.balance().spendableSat === beforeRefund, + JSON.stringify(alice.balance())); + +// --------------------------------------------------------------------------- +console.log('\n[3] the swapped funds are ordinary spendable vtxos'); +const aliceAddr = sh(`${ALICE_CLI} -q address | grep -o 'tark1[a-z0-9]*'`); +const cliBefore = JSON.parse(sh(`${ALICE_CLI} -q balance`)).spendable_sat; +await bridge.send(aliceAddr, 2000); +const cliAfter = JSON.parse(sh(`${ALICE_CLI} -q balance`)).spendable_sat; +check('bridge can spend claimed funds onward', cliAfter === cliBefore + 2000, `${cliBefore} -> ${cliAfter}`); + +console.log(ok ? '\n✅ SUCCESS: trustless third-party ark<->LN swap works' : '\n❌ some checks failed'); +process.exit(ok ? 0 : 1); |
