| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age | Files | Lines |
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A user renewed all ten of their coins (55,611 sats) from the coins page,
tried to pay a 55,300-sat invoice three minutes later, and was told only
'Payment failed'. Nothing had failed: the renewal's round ran at once,
but its coins stay unspendable until the round's transaction confirms
on-chain, and that block took 64 minutes. The quote found no spendable
coin and gave up with the generic message; nothing reached the server.
- The quote now tells apart (lnShortfall): money held by another payment
(wait, as before — now by sum, not one coin covering it all), money a
renewal holds ('Nothing was sent. N sats are being renewed…'), and a
real shortfall ('needs X sats with its fee, Y available'). Coins leaving
in an offboard or exit are never waited for.
- The manager's 'insufficient ark balance' names a renewal too.
- The coins page says before the tap that renewed coins can't be spent
until the round confirms, and that renewing every coin leaves nothing
to pay with meanwhile.
tools/ark/ln-shortfall-test.js
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01ULQZS9MQa6iAsXnrJUD9Du
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BTCPay's NWC connector requires get_info, make_invoice, lookup_invoice
and list_transactions; we never offered lookup_invoice, so it refused the
connection string.
- ArkManager.lnLookup answers lookup_invoice from wallet state (by hash or
bolt11, either direction; pending/settled/expired/failed, preimage once
claimed). A retry's several actions on one hash defer to the furthest.
- The open app pushes a pending receive along before answering, so a
merchant polling sees it settle.
- The service worker now answers make_invoice and lookup_invoice too, and
claims a paid invoice's HTLCs during the lookup: a BTCPay sale settles
with the wallet closed. Its list_transactions reports receives as well.
- get_info and the 13194 info event list the new method.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Dmcrt9KyNDKVWFKnb8BREo
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quotes from the staging ASP's own CLN (helpers take their backend), the client asks it by default on mutinynet, and the quote URL concat survives a query string
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_019WboeoetMF3MTmgT7Ew8yi
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client-side, and every invoice the ASP fetches over onion messages is verified here — payment hash read from the raw TLVs, offer terms mirrored byte-for-byte, the issuer's schnorr signature checked against LDK's exact merkle construction (proven against a live CLN-signed fixture) — so no server can hand back an invoice whose preimage it already holds. Paste an lno1 or resolve a name whose record carries one and the existing HTLC pay flow carries it (captaind's Invoice enum takes lni strings natively); a name's owner may now publish their OWN node's offer in their DNS record, retiring the registrar's stand-in — senders fetch invoices straight from their node and no coinos service ever touches the money. The /lnquote fallback prices blinded paths by entry node + advertised payinfo
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_019WboeoetMF3MTmgT7Ew8yi
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coinos wallets), lock exactly that, and a refunded miss retries with one more sat
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_014tE4U5nEjGTQy8PwYqamfv
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Speaks the proposed VtxoPolicy::Htlc (type byte 0x08): policy encode/decode,
two-leaf taproot (claimer-with-preimage / refunder-after-expiry), preimage
field on the arkoor cosign request, and GetHtlcPreimage.
ArkManager gains the swap primitives: htlcLock (lock funds claimable only
against a payment hash, refundable by us after expiry), htlcClaim (reveal the
preimage), htlcCosignRefund (hand an unclaimable HTLC back — the server
constrains the outputs to the refunder, so this is safe to expose publicly)
and acceptHtlcRefund.
tools/ark/htlc-bridge-test.js drives a full submarine swap between two
independent wallets against a patched captaind, and asserts the ASP rejects
both a wrong-preimage claim and a preimage-less spend to the bridge itself.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
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The ASP is the HTLC counterparty (second.tech's protocol), so no external
swap provider is needed: paying a bolt11 converts pubkey vtxos into
ServerHtlcSend vtxos the server can only claim by revealing the invoice
preimage; receiving grants ServerHtlcRecv vtxos claimed by revealing ours.
Failure paths cosign the HTLC back (revocation) — proven end-to-end against
regtest captaind, which independently derives the HTLC taproots.
- ark/lightning.js: bolt11 decode, lightning fee schedules, all pay/receive
gRPC-web wrappers (cosign, initiate, status, revocation, hold-invoice
receive flow, anti-DoS attestation)
- ark/send.js: arkoor builder generalized to policy outputs (pubkey /
serverHtlcSend / serverHtlcRecv), two-leaf taproot trees, HTLC clause
scripts, reusable per-part cosign helpers for package RPCs
- ark/manager.js: ln-pay and ln-recv crash-safe action state machines
(deterministic receive preimages from the seed, chain 5), mailbox
lightning notifications, unpayable-invoice -> instant revocation
- proto.js: lightning ArkInfo fields + mailbox lightning message decode
- validate/refresh: policy-aware vtxo validation and reconstruction
- features: bolt11 routes via ark when the balance covers it (Boltz stays
the fallback), lightning-invoice receive on the Ark pane
- tools/ark/ln-test.js: harness proving HTLC cosign + revocation against
captaind; manager-test.js updated for the consolidated bc-container chain
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
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