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* Lock with fingerprint or face. The padlock's "Protect this device?" now ↵Adam Soltys4 days1-5/+65
| | | | | | | offers a passkey instead of a password, and Settings → Security can turn it on or off. The saved-wallets vault is sealed under a secret only that passkey's PRF produces (behind the phone's fingerprint/face check, the passkey kept by the platform's secure hardware or password manager), so nothing in this browser's storage opens it. Opening the app on a locked device asks for the passkey by itself; a cancel leaves an Unlock button. The prompts that need the vault opened (save, forget, lock a stray wallet) take the passkey too; there's no Change password for a vault that has none; the recovery words remain the way back. The lock passkey has its own PRF salt and a marked user handle, not discoverable where the platform allows — passkey sign-in refuses it rather than derive a stranger's key from it. English + Italian strings. tools/passkey-lock-test.js (Chrome's virtual authenticator with PRF). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <[email protected]> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Vps2H27rhbG9ZqseGfMrc3
* Two new doors, no new locks: "Sign in with Google" (pomegranate — the ↵Adam Soltys2026-08-261-0/+71
nostr key FROST-sharded 2-of-3 across community operators, Google as coordinator and recovery, a plain bunker:// URI feeding the existing signer flow) and passkey sign-in (WebAuthn PRF derives the key deterministically, treated exactly like a pasted nsec, synced wherever the platform carries the passkey) — both lazy chunks, neither touching the first paint Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_019eA8JRq9Wr7z2fRQk99HLi